

# CRISIS NOTES

U-2 '60

Briefing of Cong. leaders on U-2, 9 May 60

(Dulles, Cabell, Bissell, Dandahl) Huter

Rayburn: wasn't this a rather doubtful time to release such a flight with the Summit Conf. coming on and being so close.

Huter: Any time was a bad time for doing this kind of thing if caught.

Dulles: could argue 2 ways: 1) don't take a chance of disturbing the conf; 2) it might provide useful info for the conf.

Huter: Norwegian gov really did not know we were doing this... and was telling the truth when it denied official knowledge.

[At this time, we doubted L's statement that plane had been shot down by SA-4]



~~The~~ Congressmen: Why was K so careful to operate Pres. Linn. in his statements?

Hester: Pres had not been involved in the 1 May flight but K was probably adopting this line in view of the forthcoming Summit Conf. It was very hard to tell what K had in mind and, although he personally did not believe it, there was some speculation that K did not want to go to the Summit Conference.

Also, there was some opinion K was not finding "all easy going" at home and a consideration in his attitude on the U-2 incident was strengthening his personal position at home as well as the possibility of a Summit failure.

(Raglan questioned wisdom of timing. Wilbur spread flights. Hester: had considered taking photos to UN to show what SC was up to.

No one asked: Will flights continue?)



56 11?  
57 16  
58 9  
59 19  
60 3

27 against highest-priority targets

U-2: Last 2 flights (9 Apr 60, 1 May 60) tracked fully;

2 earlier tracked only exiting over Black Sea.

April flight: much fighter activity trying to get it (photos).

[Had flights before 1 May flown over known SA-2 sites? Couldn't avoid (?) on flight across SU. BA-2's discovered in July 59

No S1 on firing networks; only intercept, tracking, passover.

No US radar tracking near shutdown. S1 on SU intercepts; collecting 2 reports some time apart, one at 65,000, other at 40,000, indicating slow descent; then shutdown at 37,000; also, indicating slow spiral descent.

But Powers observed, on return, slow descent or spiral or shutdown at 37,000; said plane began to break up immediately after explosion, at altitude. Says may have shot down their own plane at 37,000; intercept, + Powers thought he saw another parachute in the air. [If S1 had told us of capture...] over



CIA brief that Powers made fast climb of 5000 feet, at alt., to escape flock; had plane-out + plane went out of control.

Mandel; had recommended destruction by radio control.

Alternatives: barometric, G-force, loss of position signal; pilot shouldn't control.

But <sup>vs</sup> feeling that pilot must control.

(fear of false alarm?)